4-7 knowledge of our environment. "The Perception of the Operations of our own Minds within us," according to Locke, "is very like [the perception of "External Material things"], and might properly enough be call'd internal Sense" (Locke 1689 (Locke /1975 .
On this inner-sense theory (Armstrong 1968: 95; see also Lycan 1987: ch. 6, Nichols and Stich 2003: 160-4) , we have an internal "scanner" specialized for the detection of our mental states. No doubt the hypothesized inner sense is not much like our outer sensesrecall that Ryle characterizes it as "non-sensuous perception" -but it is surely unhelpful to classify its deliverances with our knowledge of mathematics and logic. 
The independence of privileged and peculiar access
It is important to distinguish privileged and peculiar access because they can come apart in both directions. Hence one can find theorists who deny that we have one kind of access while affirming that we have the other (for examples, see Byrne 2005: 81) . As the previous two sections suggest, this extreme claim is not credible, but a more restricted version is actually correct. Privileged and peculiar access do not perfectly coincide: in particular, there are many ordinary cases of the latter without the former.
For instance, the epistemic security of self-ascriptions of certain emotions or moods is at the very least nothing to write home about. One may have peculiar access to the fact that one is depressed or anxious, but here the behaviorist greeting -"You're fine! How am I?" -is not much of a joke, being closer to ordinary wisdom. 
Belief and BEL
How does one know what one believes? Evans suggested an answer: "in making a selfascription of belief, one's eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward -upon the world " (1982: 225) . Different ways of elaborating Evans' telegraphic remarks have been proposed by Gordon (1995) , Gallois (1996 ), Moran (2001 ), Fernández (2005 , and Byrne (2005) . In brief, here is the proposal in Byrne 2005.
First, a small amount of technical apparatus. Say that an epistemic rule is a conditional of the following form:
R If conditions C obtain, believe that p.
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An example is:
WEATHER If the clouds are dark grey, believe that it will rain soon.
One follows WEATHER on a particular occasion iff one believes that it will rain soon because one recognizes that the clouds are dark grey, where the 'because' is intended to mark the kind of causal connection characteristic of inference or reasoning. In general, S follows rule R on a particular occasion iff on that occasion S believes that p because she recognizes that conditions C obtain, which implies (a) S knows that conditions C obtain, which in turn implies (b) conditions C obtain, and (c) S believes that p.
Following WEATHER in typical circumstances tends to produce knowledge about impending rain; rules that are knowledge-conducive are good rules. The Evans-inspired proposal of a few paragraphs back only covers cases where one's belief that p amounts to knowledge, but of course one may know that one believes that p even though one's belief that p is false, or anyway does not amount to knowledge.
In the terminology just introduced, the fully general proposal for the epistemology of belief is this: BELIEF Knowledge of one's beliefs can be, and typically is, obtained by trying to follow BEL.
BELIEF implies that trying to follow BEL is knowledge-conducive -that BEL is a very good rule.
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Now true beliefs, or even true beliefs that could not easily have been false, are not thereby knowledge. So the fact that BEL is strongly self-verifying does not entail that it is a very good rule. It does, however, rebut an obvious objection. And given the intuitive plausibility of Evans' claim that we know what we believe by "directing our eyes outward," the burden of proof is on the critics. BELIEF is at least a defensible working hypothesis.
BELIEF, if true, offers a satisfying explanation of both privileged and peculiar access. Privileged access is explained because BEL is strongly self-verifying. Peculiar access is explained because the method involved only works in one's own case: third person rules like BEL-3 are bad.
For the sake of the argument, assume that BELIEF is true. Is there any need to press on, and try to force all self-knowledge -a fortiori, knowledge of one's desiresinto this rough mold?
Economy and unification
In answering that question, two distinctions will be helpful. To introduce the first, consider our knowledge of metaphysical modality. On one (popular) view, it requires a special epistemic capacity of modal intuition. On the alternative Williamsonian picture, it requires nothing more than our "general cognitive ability to handle counterfactual The popular view, on the other hand, is extravagant: knowledge of metaphysical modality needs something extra.
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A similar "economical-extravagant" distinction can be drawn for self-knowledge.
Let us say that a theory of self-knowledge is economical just in case it purports to explain self-knowledge solely in terms of epistemic capacities and abilities that are needed for knowledge of other subject matters; otherwise it is extravagant. A behaviorist account of self-knowledge is economical: the capacities for self-knowledge are precisely the capacities for knowledge of the minds of others. The theory defended in Shoemaker 1994
is also economical: here the relevant capacities are "normal intelligence, rationality, and conceptual capacity" (Shoemaker 1994: 236) . On the other hand, the inner-sense theory (see section 1.2 above) is extravagant: the organs of outer perception, our general rational capacity, and so forth, do not account for all our self-knowledge. For that, an additional mechanism, an "internal scanner," is needed.
The second distinction is between unified and disunified theories of selfknowledge. Simple versions of the behaviorist and inner-sense theories are unified: for any mental state M, the account of how one knows one is in M is broadly the same -by observing one's behavior, or by deploying one's "internal scanner." But some philosophers adopt a divide-and-conquer strategy, resulting in more-or-less disunified theories. For instance Davidson (1984) and Moran (2001) [I]t is difficult to claim that the self-ascription of belief [à la Evans] provides a model of self-knowledge that can be used in order to understand our awareness of our own, say, desires because there seems to be no "outward-directed" question that bears the kind of relation to "Do I want X?" that the question "Is it the case that p?" bears to "Do I believe that p?" (Finkelstein 2003: 161) 11 If these philosophers are right, and the world-to-mind account that seems so promising for belief is hopeless for desire, then the account for belief should be rejected too.
(Nichols and Stich, at least, reject it.) Contrariwise, if the world-to-mind account for belief is right, then there must be a similar account that works for desire. The next section takes up the challenge of finding it.
10 'Ascent routine strategy' is a phrase of Gordon's (1996) , whom Nichols and Stich are specifically 
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know, we may grant, that conditions are ideal. Given the equivalence, do I know that cycling is desirable by inferring it from the counterfactual, which I infer in turn from truth of both the antecedent and the consequent? If so, then there is a clear problem of circularity. But how do I know that the antecedent is true, that conditions are ideal? Since the chief purchase I have on "ideal conditions" is that they allow me to desire the desirable, the obvious answer is that I know that conditions are ideal because I know that cycling is desirable and that I want to go cycling. But then the epistemological direction is again from left to right, rather than -as the objector would have it -from right to left. If I know that cycling is desirable prior to knowing that conditions are ideal, then (granted the equivalence) I can infer the counterfactual from the fact that cycling is desirable.
The circularity objection is, at the very least, hard to make stick. Let us now turn to some complications.
DES and defeasibility
To say that we typically follow (or try to follow) rule R is not to say that we always do.
The rule WEATHER ('If the skies are dark grey, believe that it will rain soon') is a good enough rule of thumb, but it is defeasible -additional evidence (or apparent evidence)
can block the inference from the premise about the skies to the conclusion about rain. For example, if one knows (or believes) that the trusted weather forecaster has confidently predicted a dry but overcast day, one might not believe that it will rain soon despite knowing (or believing) that the skies are dark grey.
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Given that DES is only practically (strongly) self-verifying, one might expect that rule to be defeasible too. And indeed the example of accidie, used earlier to show that DES is only practically self-verifying, also shows that it is defeasible.
In that example, I am lying miserably on the sofa, contemplating the pleasures of a bike ride in the sunshine. This is not just a situation in which I know that cycling is a desirable option but nevertheless do not want to go cycling. It is also a situation in which I do not believe that I want to go cycling. Yet if I slavishly followed DES, I would believe that I wanted to go cycling. So why don't I?
I believe that I am not going to go cycling, but that is not why I don't think I want to go: I sometimes take myself to want to φ when I believe that I am not going to. For example, I really want to read Mind and World this evening, but that is not going to happen because I don't have the book with me.
A better suggestion is that I believe I do not want to go cycling because I believe I intend to remain on the sofa. I do not believe I intend to avoid reading Mind and World this evening, so at least the suggestion does not falsely predict that I will take myself to lack the desire to read Mind and World. However, it is obviously not right as it stands.
Suppose, to return to the earlier restaurant example, I want to go both to the Indian restaurant and to the sushi bar, and I then form the intention to go to the Indian restaurant, on the grounds that this option is slightly more desirable. When I realize that I have this intention, I will not thereby refuse to ascribe a desire to go the sushi bar: if the Indian restaurant turns out to be closed, I might say to my companion "No worries, I also wanted to eat Japanese."
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This highlights a crucial difference between the cycling and restaurant examples:
in the cycling case I do not think that remaining on the sofa is a desirable option -I intend to stay there despite realizing that there is little to be said for doing so. I don't think I want to go cycling because, if I did, why on earth don't I go? The means to go cycling are ready to hand, and the alternative is quite undesirable.
In general, then, this is one way in which DES can be defeated. Suppose one knows that φing is a desirable option, and considers the question of whether one wants to φ. One will not follow DES and conclude one wants to φ, if one believes (a) that one intends to ψ, (b) that ψing is incompatible with φing, and (c) that ψing is neither desirable nor better overall than φing.
That explains why I don't follow DES in the cycling case, and so don't take myself to want to go cycling. Here the action I intend is not the one I think desirable, and neither is it the one I think best, all things considered. More common cases of action without desire are when the intended action is taken to be the best, as in the earlier restaurant example with the tedious dinner companion. Dinner at the Indian restaurant will be terribly boring and I won't have a good time; nonetheless, it is the best course of action available, perhaps even beating out other options (like staying at home with a good book) that are actually desirable. I intend to go, but I really don't want to.
Something else needs explaining, though. It is not just that I fail to believe that I want to go cycling -I also know that I lack this desire. I also know that I lack the desire to go to the Indian restaurant. So how do I know that I don't want to go cycling, or don't want to go to the Indian restaurant? (Read these with the negation taking wide scope: not wanting to go, as opposed to wanting not to go.)
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In the boring dinner example, I know that going to the Indian restaurant is not to be said for it.
Conclusion
As the discussion of the last section brings out, the epistemology of desire is not selfcontained, in at least two ways.
First, although one's own desires are not among the features that make for the desirability of an option, one's other mental states sometimes are. For instance, I might well conclude that I want to go to the Indian restaurant partly on the basis of the fact that I like Indian food: I like, say, andar palak and plain naans. Liking andar palak (in the usual sense in which one likes a kind of food) is not to be equated with wanting to eat it.
One may want to eat broccoli for health reasons without liking it; conversely, one may like double bacon cheeseburgers but not want to eat one. Liking andar palak is doubtfully any kind of desire at all. There is no clear circularity worry here, but the considerations of 22 A similar explanation can be given of the truth of the narrow scope reading -why I also know that I want not to go to the Indian restaurant. Second, the last section suggested that the complete epistemology of desire partly depends on the epistemology of intention. And in any event, given the case for a unified theory of self-knowledge, if intention cannot be squeezed into the world-to-mind format, that casts doubt on the account defended here. At least that is an excuse for another paper. 24 
